BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHIARYBDIS: TITLE I's
"COMPARABLE SERVICES" REQUIREMENT AND
STATE AND FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSES
BETSY LEVIN*

Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 19651
provides funds to be used for the benefit of disadvantaged children in
need of compensatory educational services, regardless of whether those

children attend a public or private school.2 In little more than ten years
of operation, the Title I program has become a vital source of funding

for school districts with large concentrations of children from lowincome families.3
The 1965 legislation was the first major federal aid-to-education
legislation to be adopted since the end of World War

]1,4

ending a

twenty-year drought of congressional activity which stemmed in part
* A.B. 1956, Bryn Mawr College; LL.B. 1966, Yale University. Associate Professor of Law, Duke University. Part of this Article is based on a speech delivered by the
author at the National School Finance Conference in March, 1975, prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 241a-m (1970).
2. A "local education agency" may not receive a grant under Title I unless
to the extent consistent with the number of educationally deprived children in
the school district of the local educational agency who are enrolled in private
elementary and secondary schools, such agency shall make provision for including special educational services and arrangements . . . in which such children can participate. . . . 20 U.S.C.A. § 241e-1(a) (Supp. 1976).
The intent to include nonpublic school children as beneficiaries under Title I is also
evidenced by the congressional declaration of policy which pointedly refers to "educationally deprived children" without limiting this class to those educationally deprived
children who attend public schools. 20 U.S.C. § 241a (1970). The Supreme Court
noted in Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402 (1974), that surely "Congress . . . recognized
that all children from educationally deprived areas do not necessarily attend the public
schools. . . ." Id. at 405-06.
3. The appropriation for Title I programs has grown from $1 billion in fiscal 1966
to $1.8 billion in fiscal 1974. Approximately 6 million children in some 13,900 school
districts throughout the country in 1974 were being served by Title I programs. H.R.
REP. No. 805, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), in 3 U.S. CODE CONGa. & AD. NEws 4093,
4095 (1974).
4. The only exceptions were the Act of Sept. 30, 1950, ch. 1124, 64 Stat. 1100
and the Act of Sept. 23, 1950, ch. 995, 64 Stat. 967, both federally impacted areas aid.
This program provided financial assistance to school districts in areas affected by certain
federal activities, such as federal ownership of land or an influx of children whose parents live on or are employed on nontaxable federal property.
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from serious doubts about the extent to which federal aid to parochial
schools would impinge upon the prohibitions of the first amendment
to the United States Constitution or similar state constitutional bans.5
The establishment clause barriers to funding for parochial schools functioned as a political obstacle to federal aid to public schools, since the
omission of parochial schools from any substantial aid program would
raise strong objections to the consequent discrimination against churchrelated schools.8 It was to escape this political-constitutional thicket
that Title I expressly earmarks federal funds for disadvantaged children
and not as general aid for schools, thus enabling parochial school children to share in the benefits of the Act.'
Congress, however, designed the aid program to be administered
under the auspices of local (public) school boards,' which in turn are
subject to state constitutional limitations on expenditures for nonpublic
educational purposes. The result of this congressional arrangement
was some confusion over the effect of state law limitations on Title I
funds: the money comes from the federal treasury, but its use is largely
administered by state officials. 9 Is the spending of Title I funds thus
subject to state law prohibitions against appropriations to sectarian educational entities? If so, the impact on the entire Title I program, which
must be provided on a comparable basis to both public and private
school students, 10 could be quite substantial, and the program might
find itself straitjacketed by the very mechanism which permitted its
creation in the first place.
Apart from these perplexing state law questions, there remains a
major question with regard to the first amendment to the Federal Constitution. Title I was indeed drafted as an aid program for all children
5. The principal concerns of Congress were often categorized as the three "R's":
Red, Race, and Religion. In addition to the parochial aid issue, other concerns included
whether federal aid to education would lead to federal control of education, which traditionally had been a state and local concern and responsibility, and whether federal aid
to districts which maintained racially segregated schools could be justified. See J. SUNDQUIST, POLITICS AND PoLIcY: THE EISENHOWER, KENNEDY AND JOHNSON YEARS 15556 (1968).

6. Id. at 188-95.
7. For a general discussion of the enactment of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, see BAILEY & MOSHER, ESEA: THE OFFICE OF EDUCATION ADMINISTERS
A LAW

(1968);

MERANTO, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL AiD TO EDUCATION IN

1965 (1967).

8. 20 U.S.C. § 241a (1970); id. § 244(6)(B).
9. 20 U.S.C.A. § 241e(a) (Supp. 1976).
10. 45 C.F.R. § 116.19(b) (1975). See U.S. D.P'T OF H.E.W., OFFICE OF EDUCATION, ESEA TrLE I PRornM GUIDE # 44, printed in U.S. DEP'T OF H.E.W., OFICE
OF EDUCATION, TITLE I ESEA PARTICIPATION OF PRrVATE SCHOOL CHILDREN-A HANDOOK FOR STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS 39, 41 (1971).
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specifically to avoid the constitutional problems associated with direct
aid to parochial schools. Nevertheless, at the time the bill was passed

the full ramifications of establishment clause barriers to government
assistance to private school students had not been articulated," and the

shape that such aid could take had not been clearly set forth.
Two recent decisions of the Supreme Court, one near the end of
2 the other in the closing weeks
the 1974 term, Wheeler v. Barrera,1

of the 1975 term, Meek v. Pittenger,"s have established the broad outlines of the answers to these difficult questions. This Article will

examine those decisions, explore their impact on the Title I program,
and draw some conclusions about the future directions of federal

aid-to-education efforts."x
I.

STATE/FEDERAL CONCERNS:

Wheeler v. Barrera

The Constitution of the State of Missouri explicitly prohibits the
use of any "public funds" to aid sectarian institutions.'5 In 1966, the
11. As of 1965, the only decision of the Supreme Court which directly considered
the prohibitions of the establishment clause in the context of state aid to private education was Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). However, after 1965 the
Court began to indicate with greater precision what would constitute governmental actions toward private school students. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Hunt
v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Committee
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See generally
Wilson, Lewin, Pfeffer, et al., Commentary: The Sectarian School Aid Decisions, 3 J.
LAW & ED. 101 (1974).
12. 417 U.S. 402 (1974).
13. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
14. Further clarification can be expected from two suits now pending. The National Coalition for Public Education and Religious Liberty (PEARL), representing numerous education groups nationwide, has brought suit against the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare challenging department regulations governing Title I programs
which permit publicly paid teachers to teach disadvantaged children in parochial schools.
Complaint, National Coalition for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Mathews, Civil No.
76-888 (S.D.N.Y., filed Feb. 25, 1976). See also notes 47-49 infra and accompanying
text. PEARL is also considering challenging the by-pass provisions of the Title I regulations. See EDUC. DAILY, Jan. 30, 1976, at 1. See also notes 54-55 infra and accompanying text.
The American Civil Liberties Union recently filed suits against two Rhode Island
school districts and the Rhode Island Department of Education for sending public school
teachers, supported by Title I funds, into Catholic schools. EDUC. DAILY, Jan. 8, 1976,
at 5.
15. The constitutional provisions are as follows:
[A]ll moneys, bonds, lands, and other property belonging to or donated to any
state fund for public school purposes, and the net proceeds . . . shall be paid
into the state treasury. . . and. . . preserved as a public school fund the annual income of which shall be faithfully appropriated for establishing and
maintaining free public schools and for no other uses or purposes whatsoever.
Mo. CONST. art. 9, § 5.
Neither the... school district or other municipal corporation, shall ever...
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Missouri state supreme court prohibited the use of "dual enrollment"
as a means of carrying out joint instructional programs for public and
nonpublic school children. 16 Under this system, children who were
enrolled fulltime in nonpublic schools were released by their schools
several times a week to attend special classes in public schools. 17 The
state court also barred the use of public school teachers on nonpublic
school premises to provide speech therapy programs.' 8 The case, however, involved only the use of state funds; thus the opinion did not purport to deal with Title I or any federal education program.
The Missouri State Board of Education nevertheless interpreted

the state supreme court opinion as applying to Title I funds, treating
federal funds as "public funds" for purposes of the anti-parochial aid
provisions in the state constitution.' 9 The State Board attempted to
conform its use of Title I funds to the "comparability" requirements
of the Act2° and to the restrictions of the state court decision through
the following regulations:
(a) [S]hared time or dual enrollment between public and nonpublic
schools would not be in conformity -with state law. Programs
operated in the public school for all children after regular school
hours, on Saturday, and during the summer after close of the regular school term would be in conformity with state law.
pay from any public fund whatever, anything in aid of any.

. .

sectarian pur-

pose, or to help to support. . . any. . . institution of learning controlled by
any religious creed. . . . Id. § 8.
[No money shall ever be taken from the public treasury . . . in aid of any

church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid of any priest, preacher, minister or teacher thereof, as such; . . . no preference shall be given to nor any
discrimination made against any church. . . . Id. art. 1, § 7.
16. Special Dist. v. Wheeler, 408 S.W.2d 60 (Mo. 1966).
17. The Missouri court, interpreting the compulsory school law as requiring students
to remain in their own schools for a full six-hour day, found that parochial school children could not, therefore, attend classes in public school buildings during regular school
hours. Special Dist. v. Wheeler, 408 S.W.2d 60, 63-64 (Mo. 1966). The United States
Supreme Court has not yet been confronted with a first amendment challenge to a dual
enrollment plan. Other states, with similarly strict state constitutional provisions, have
upheld dual enrollment plans. See, e.g., Morton v. Board of Educ., 69 Ill. App. 2d 38,
216 N.E.2d 305 (1966). The so-called "Blaine Amendment" in New York, N.Y.
CONsT. art. XI, § 3, prohibits any aid to nonpublic schools. This has been interpreted
by that state's attorney general as not applying to the use of federal funds in private
schools as long as federal funds are kept separate from state and local monies. See Op.
N.Y. A'rr'y GEN. 36-37 (1975). Thus, in New York, Title I funds could be utilized
for dual enrollment programs even if the state prohibited the use of its own funds for
such programs. For a discussion of the constitutionality of dual enrollment, see Calhoun, The Elementary and Secondary Education Act and the Establishment Clause, 9
VALPAuAISO L. REv. 487, 504-11 (1975).
18. 408 S.W.2d at 63.
19. See Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402, 412-14 & n.9 (1974).
20. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
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(b) Special educational services and arrangements, including broadened instructional offerings made available to children in private
schools, shall be provided at public facilities. Public school
personnel shall not be made available in private facilities. This
does not prevent the inclusion in a project of special educational
arrangements to provide educational radio and television to stu21
dents at private schools.
But under any definition, Missouri public school officials were not
providing "comparable services" to Title I-eligible students attending
nonpublic schools. 22 These students were provided Title I-funded
equipment, materials, and supplies but no personnel services (although
in some Missouri school districts Title I programs held in public school
facilities after regular school hours and during the summer were open
to all educationally deprived children). By contrast, in the public
schools, programs such as remedial reading, remedial arithmetic, and
speech therapy were offered during the regular school day. Furthermore, Title I per pupil expenditures between public and private schools
were not "comparable. 2 3 Expenditures ranged from about $10 to $85
for the disadvantaged nonpublic school student to about $210 to $275
for the disadvantaged public school student.2 4
One senses that there was a lack of cooperation on both sides.2 5
Public school officials did little to lessen the disparities in the allocation
of Title I funds to the parochial schools, while parochial school officials
insisted that "comparable" services, as used in Title I, had to mean
both the assignment of public school teachers for remedial instruction
on the premises of the parochial schools and their assignment during
the regular school day rather than only during after-school hours as was
the contention of the public school officials.2 6
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the programs
provided Missouri's nonpublic school children were not comparable, as
contemplated by the federal law, and that special services must be provided by the public agency on private as well as public school
premises.2 7 Federal law, the court found, determines whether Title
21. See Barrera v. Wheeler, 475 F.2d 1338, 1350 (8th Cir. 1973), aff'd 417 U.S.
402 (1974). Interestingly, the Missouri Attorney General ruled that federal funds are
not state public school funds within the meaning of the state constitutional provision.
Op. Mo. ATr'Y GEN. No. 26 (1970).
22. Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402, 415 (1974).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 410 n.7.
25. Id. at 409.
26. Id.
27. Barrera v. Wheeler, 475 F.2d 1338, 1344 (8th Cir. 1973), aff'd 417 U.S. 402
(1974).
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I funds are to be treated as "state" funds or "federal" funds for purposes of state constitutional and statutory restrictions.28 The question
was resolved for Missouri by a finding that Title I funds, being federal
funds, can be used for personnel services and that expenditures are not
subject to state restrictions barring the use of public funds to provide
public school teachers to parochial schools. 9 The court reasoned that
Title I appropriations are a federal grant made "in trust" to local school

agencies for the direct benefit of the disadvantaged child, as evidenced
by the following:
(1) Title I funds are not to be commingled with other "public funds;" 30
(2) Title I funds are not to supplement funds already used for educational purposes in the state;31
(3) The state cannot pass a law or interpret its own laws to make a
Title I grant "state" or "public funds;" 32 and
(4) Title I does not provide school aid to a state or school33districtit provides educational services to disadvantaged children.

The Supreme Court, in affirming the circuit court's disposition of
the case, 34 took the position that Title I did not require school systems
to use publicly employed -teachers in parochial schools during school

hours if such a practice would violate state law. For the majority, the
legislative history of the Act and the language of both the Act and the

regulations "reveal[ed] the intent of Congress to place plenary responsibility in local and state agencies for the formulation of suitable programs under the Act."3 5 Thus, the Supreme Court found "specific con28. Id. at 1351-52.
29. Id.at 1353.
30. Id. at 1352.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402 (1974).
35. Id. at 415-16, The legislative history of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) indicates that Congress was aware of and concerned about
possibly conflicting state laws and their effect on the implementation of the Act. See
H.R. REP. No. 143, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965), quoted in Wheeler v. Barrera, 417
U.S. 402, 416 (1974). The Court also noted that the official handbook prepared by
the Office of Education for state and local officials recognizes that "state law is to be
accommodated." Id.at 417 n.13. In this publication, the Office of Education explains
that there are various state laws which could prohibit the following types of aid to parochial schools (some states have more than one of these provisions):
* Dual enrollment may not be allowed.
* Public school personnel may not perform services on private school premises.
* Equipment may not be loaned for use on private school premises.
* Books may not be loaned for use on private school premises.
* Transportation may not be provided to private school students.
U.S. DEP'T OF H.E.W., OFFicn oF EDUCATION, TTLE I ESEA PARTICIPATION
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gressional intent" that "state constitutional spending proscriptions not
be pre-empted as a condition of accepting federal funds." '
The Court stated in Wheeler that it would expect a state to make
the following determinations if Title I funding were sought:
(1) The state must first determine whether Title I funds are "state
fund[s] for public school purposes" within the proscription of the
state constitution.
(2) If the state so construes Title I funds, then federal law must
accommodate itself to the state requirement.
(3) If state law prohibits the use of Title I funds for on-the-premises
private school instruction, then other services-not proscribed
under state law-must be developed.
(4) Since "comparable" services does not mean "identical," the state
must design a different program for private schools so as to avoid
7
state restrictions yet still be comparable (and not inferior).3
If, in accordance with this scenario, state law is found to prevent
on-the-premises instruction in private schools, the Court suggested
three remaining options that are still open to the state:38
(1) The state can provide "comparable" services, using other than onthe-premises instruction in private schools.3 9 (Justice Blackman
provided a laundry list of possible alternatives. 40 )
(2) If the state is unable to provide "comparable" services, it must
develop a plan eliminating the use of on-the-premises instruction
in public schools, resorting instead "to other means, such as
OF PRIVATE SCHOOL CmLDREN-A HANDBOOK FOR STATE AND LOCAL OFFIcmLs

19 (1971).
It has been noted that the constitutions of over thirty states expressly prohibit the use
of any state funds for the support, direct or indirect, of church-related schools. Brademas, The Case for Categorical Aid, in THE PoLrncs OF EDuCATON AT TE LocAL,
STATE AND FEDERAL LEVELS (M. Kirst ed. 1970). Whether federal aid is money
"donated to any state fund for public school purposes" within the meaning of the Missouri constitution was, therefore, "purely a question of state and not federal law." Federal law under Title I "is to the effect that state law should not be disturbed." Wheeler
v.Barrera, 417 U.S. 402, 418-19 (1974). In addition to the legislative history and reports, Justice Blackmun referred to an express congressional stipulation in the law that
[no provision of . . . the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965
• .. shall be construed to authorize any department, agency, officer or employee of the United States to exercise any direction, supervision, or control
over the curriculum, program of instruction, administration, or personnel of
any educational institution, school, or school system . . . . 20 U.S.C. § 1232a
(1970), quoted in 417 U.S. at 416.
36. Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402, 416-17 (1974).
37. Id. at 421-23 & n.17.
38. Id. at 423-26.
39. Id. at 423-25.
40. Id. at 425 n.20.
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neutral sites or summer programs that are less likely to give rise
to the gross disparity present in [Wheeler]." 41
(3) If that is not acceptable, the state has the option of nonparticipation in the Title I program altogether 42-hardly an option likely
to appeal to state school officials.
The Supreme Court having held that "comparable" does not mean
"identical,' 43 although it must not mean inferior," Missouri will now
have to determine whether a program can be designed which will avoid
the state prohibitions yet still be "comparable" within the requirements
of Title I. A recent state c6urt decision, Mallory v. Barrera,45 prohibits
the use of Title I funds for on-the-premises private school instruction
by public school teachers during regular school hours on the ground
that Title I funds are "state funds" within the meaning of the state constitutional proscriptions. The court did not, however, rule out the use
of public school teachers on those same premises after regular school
hours, or other "acceptable plans" under Title I,41 although whether
such alternative programs are "comparable in quality, scope, and opportunity for participation" remains an as yet unanswered question.
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare is revising its
Title I guidelines for the participation of children enrolled in private
schools, and the final regulations are expected to be out shortly.4 7 Proposed regulations, released in March, 1975,"4 were drafted to reflect
the Supreme Court's decision in Wheeler. The proposed regulations
state that
services and activities may be provided to [private school] children
which are different from those provided to public school children.
However, . . . those services and activities must be comparable in
quality, scope, and opportunity for participation to those provided to
49
public school children with needs of equally high priority.
It may well be, then, that Missouri will be able to provide services that
are "comparable in quality, scope, and opportunity for participation"
through the use of remedial teachers before and after school hours and
41. Id. at 425.
42. Id. at 425-26.
43. Id. at 420-21.
44. Id. at 422 n.17.
45. Civil No. 782847 (Cir. Ct. Jackson County, Mo., filed Sept. 2, 1975).
46. The court noted that it did not have "either the right or the jurisdiction to fire
a judicial blast and sink the Federal gold barge and thus isolate all educationally deprived school children in Missouri from Title I funds." Id. at 9.
47. See EDuc. DAILY, Feb. 2, 1976, at 5.
48. 40 Fed. Reg. 11,477 (1975).
49. Proposed HEW Reg. § 116a.23(c), 40 Fed. Reg. 11,483 (1975).
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during the summer. Missouri public school officials, prior to the
decision in Mallory v. Barrera,had prohibited the assignment of public
school personnel to private school facilities at any time, thus severely
limiting the amount spent per disadvantaged nonpublic school pupil.10
One effect of this decision, then, could be to narrow considerably the
gap in expenditures between disadvantaged public school and nonpublic school students.
In Wheeler, Justice Blackmun stated at several points that "Title
I was not intended to override. . . individualized state restrictions." 1
The Act and its legislative history make clear that Congress intended
to impose certain national priorities or interests upon existing state and
local structures, without at the same time disrupting the balance

between federal and state powers in a highly sensitive area that, until
very recently, had been almost the sole prerogative of state and local

officials.5 2 States such as Missouri, by imposing restrictions on the use
of Title I funds for disadvantaged children in parochial schools, 53 are

in large part responsible for the enactment in 1974 of the "bypass"
amendment to Title I,"only two months after the decision in Wheeler
v. Barrera. This amendment requires the United States Commissioner

of Education to "bypass" local educational agencies which, because of
state legal restrictions or for any other reason, have failed to provide

for the participation of nonpublic school students in Title I programs.
Thus the Commissioner is to arrange for the provision of services to

such students directly, using funds from the local education agency's
Title I allocation. 5 5
50. See notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text.
51. Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402, 421 (1974); see id. at 417, 419.
52. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1232a (1970) (quoted at note 35 supra).
53. A survey undertaken by the U.S. Office of Education at the request of the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402, 411 n.8 (1974),
indicated that Missouri is the only state in the nation which both prohibits educationally
deprived children in nonpublic schools from participating in dual enrollment or "shared
time" Title I programs (provided in public school facilities or on "neutral territory"),
and also prohibits Title I instructional services from being provided to educationally deprived school children on private school premises by public school personnel during regular school hours.
54. 20 U.S.C.A. § 241e-1 (Supp. 1976).
55. (b) (1) Waiver of requirement of local educationalagency participation
If a local educational agency is prohibited by law from providing for the
participation in special programs for educationally deprived children enrolled
in private elementary and secondary schools as required by subsection (a) of
this section, the Commissioner shall waive such requirement and the provisions
of section 241e(a) (2) of this title, and shall arrange for the provision of services to such children through arrangements which shall be subject to the requirements of subsection (a) of this section.
(2) Arrangements for services where local education agency fails to provide
for participationon equitable basis
If the Commissioner determines that a local educational agency has sub-

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1976:39

The Wheeler opinion will have substantial implications for public
and private educators alike. As an initial matter, if the states can
determine how federal funds are to be treated, the impact of Title I

may be very different among similarly situated states. Illustrative is
a decision by Michigan's highest court, interpreting a strict constitutional prohibition against aid to parochial schools,5 6 one that on its face
could be said to be even more restrictive than Missouri's. 57 The

Michigan court reached the following conclusions:
(1)

Auxiliary services, interpreted as a benefit to the child, or as aid
for "the general health ai,, welfare" rather than aid to an institution, are permissible under this constitutional amendment.5 8

stantially failed to provide for the participation on an equitable basis of educationally deprived children enrolled in private elementary and secondary
schools as required by subsection (a) of this section, he shall arrange for the
provision of services to such children through arrangements which shall be subject to the requirements of subsection (a) of this section, upon which determination the provisions of paragraph (a) and section 241e(a)(2) of this title
shall be waived.
(3) Payment of cost of arrangedservices from appropriateallocations
When the Commissioner arranges for services pursuant to this section, he
shall, after consultation with the appropriate public and private school officials,
pay the cost of such services from the appropriate allocation or allocations under this subchapter. 20 U.S.C.A. § 241e-1 (Supp. 1976).
See H.R. REP. No. 805, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), in 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws
4093, 4109 (1974).
The amendment was adopted because of the difficulty of enforcing the provision
that a local education agency was not to receive any Title I funds until it provided for
the participation of eligible private school children. Id. The legislative history also
notes that this provision was modeled after Title III, which was amended in 1970 to
provide such a bypass provision. 20 U.S.C. § 845(f) (1) (1970). Title III regulations
provide that in the event that "no State agency is authorized to provide, or there is a
substantial failure to provide for effective participation on an equitable basis by private
school children" the Commissioner is to contract with institutions of higher education
or other nonprofit organizations to provide Title I services to such children, the cost
to be paid out of the state's allotment. 40 Fed. Reg. 51,016 (1975). The legislative
history of the Title III bypass provision makes it clear that the payment of federal fufids
to private schools or school officials is not permitted. S. REP. No. 634, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1970), in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 2768, 2863 (1970).
The Title I bypass provision may be challenged in a suit filed by The National
Coalition for Public Education and Religious Liberty against the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare. See note 14 supra.
56. No public monies or property shall be appropriated or paid or any public
credit utilized, by the legislature, or any other political subdivision or agency of
the state directly or indirectly to aid or maintain any private, denominational
or other nonpublic, pre-elementary, elementary, or secondary school. No payment, credit, tax benefit, exemption or deductions, tuition voucher, subsidy,
grant or loan of public monies or property shall be provided directly or indirectly, to support the attendance of any student or the employment of any
persons at any such nonpublic school or any location or institution where instruction is offered in whole or in part to such nonpublic school students. The
legislature may provide for the transportation of students to and from any
school. MICH. CONST. art. 8, § 2.
57. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
58. Traverse City School Dist. v. Attorney General, 384 Mich. 390, 417-21, 185

4.W.2d 9, 20-22 (1971).
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These services include the teaching of remedial reading, the
counseling of physically handicapped children, speech correction
services, and the like.5 9 Even though public school employees
provide such services on private school premises, 60 such services
are general health and safety measures "to remedy physical and
mental deficiencies of school children and provide for their physical health and safety," 61 and as such, "they have only an inci02
dental relation to the instruction of private school children."
Federal funds, and in particular Title I funds, are not subject to
the state constitutional prohibition since
(a) Title I funds are used for auxiliary services (already
found to be exempt even when provided solely from state
funds): and
(b) Title I funds are not '"public monies", which term refers
63
only to state resources and not federal funds.

Contrast this with the construction of a similar constitutional
provision by the Missouri Supreme Court. 64 That court recently struck
down a statute which provided for the lending of books purchased with
state funds to students attending both public and nonpublic schools as
violative of the state constitutional prohibition on aid to parochial
schools.

5

The Missouri cour's view of child benefits or child/parent

benefits is thus not nearly as expansive as Michigan's.

Indeed,

Missouri's constitutional provision is treated by that state as much more

One
restrictive than the first amendment to the Federal Constitution.
effect of Wheeler, then, may be to move away from a federal policy
expressly designed to provide extra resources to meet the educational
needs of disadvantaged children, regardless of the nature of the institu59. MicH. STAT. ANN. § 15.3622 (1968).

60. 384 Mich. at 420, 185 N.W.2d at 22.
61. Id. at 418-19, 185 N.W.2d at 21.
62. Id. at 419, 185 N.W.2d at 22.
63. Id. at 422-23, 185 N.W.2d at 23-24.
64. See notes 15-16 supra.
65. Paster v. Tussey, 512 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1111
(1975).
66. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). This raises the question
of whether at some point a state's decision to go beyond the first amendment's establishment clause in providing for separation of church and state might violate the free exercise clause. "Mhe Court has struggled to find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which if expanded
to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other." Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970). See also Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 387 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). "Any interpretation of [the Establishment Clause] and the constitutional values it serves must also take account of the free exercise clause and the values
it serves." Id. at 395, quoting P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 79 (1964).
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tion which they attend. The majority's opinion in Wheeler has placed
Missouri in the position-should the state be unable to devise a plan
providing "comparable" services to nonpublic schools--of having to
dilute its compensatory programs for all disadvantaged children or hav67
ing no federal compensatory program at all.
Another question is what Wheeler might mean for other federal
aid-to-education programs which provide funds for nonpublic schools,
e.g., the National School Lunch Act,6 8 the National Defense Education
Act, 0 and the Bilingual Education Program.7 0 Do state laws similarly
restrict the distribution of funds under these programs to nonpublic
schools? In holding that federal law under Title I contemplates that
state law is not to be preempted but accommodated, the Supreme
Court was careful to point out that this result was mandated by the
legislative history, the language of the Act, and the regulations pertaining to that Act. Thus, it would seem that where congressional intent
is less clear, or where there is a clear congressional purpose to impose
of state law, Wheeler should
national educational priorities regardless
71
not present an insurmountable obstacle.
II.

THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE:

Meek v. Pittenger

After Wheeler v. Barrera, the states still were free to explore
several options72 in their attempts to reconcile the Title I mandate that
federal funds be made available to all eligible children-in public or
private schools-with state law prohibitions on the use of public funding for sectarian institutions. The picture was further complicated,
however, when the Supreme Court decided to consider, in Meek v.
Pittenger,7 3 the first amendment implications of state funding programs
which were aimed at achieving some of the same educational goals that
were the object of Title I. The precise issue before the Court in Meek
was the constitutional validity of state efforts to assist private sectarian
67. 417 U.S. at 425.
68. The National School Lunch Act provides federal funds to defray the costs of
school lunches for private school children. 42 U.S.C. § 1759 (1970).
69. The National Defense Education Act provides loans to nonprofit private schools
for the procurement of educational equipment in academic subjects. 20 U.S.C. § 445
(1970).
70. The Bilingual Education Act provides federal funds to private schools using bilingual educational methods in areas where there are children with limited English language skills. 20 U.S.C.A. § 880b-7(b) (2) (c) (ii) (Supp. 1976).
71. See generally Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623 (1975).
72. 417 U.S. at 423-26. See notes 38-42 supra and accompanying text.
73. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
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schools through aid limited to the nonsectarian, purely educational
functions of such schools. 74 For those concerned with the vitality of
Title I funding, the broader question concerns the scope of the immunity from establishment clause challenge afforded a public aid program
by the device of earmarking such funds for children as opposed to the
schools themselves The import for Title I, which largely provides the
salaries of remedial math and reading instructors and which must
supply comparable services for both public and nonpublic students, is
manifest: what kinds of programs can be maintained under Title I
without running afoul of first amendment prohibitions?
Over the course of the last few decades, the Supreme Court has
evolved a three-pronged test for determining whether state or federal
action respecting nonpublic school education violates the establishment
clause of the first amendment.7 5 The full test was first articulated in
Lemon v. Kurtzman"6 and has been reiterated in more recent Supreme
Court cases. 77 To be upheld, the law being challenged as a violation
of the first amendment
78
(1) must reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose;

(2) must have a primary effect that neithe- advances nor inhibits
religion; 79 and
(3) must avoid excessive government entanglement with religion.80
Using this tripartite test, the Court has invalidated a state statute
authorizing reimbursement of nonpublic elementary schools for the cost
of teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials in specified
secular subjects, and a state statute providing a direct salary supplement
74. For a general discussion of Meek see The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HArv.
L. REv. 47, 104-10 (1975).

75. In Meek the Court said the three-pronged test "constitute[s] a convenient, accurate distillation of this Court's efforts over the past decades to evaluate a wide range
of governmental action challenged as violative of the constitutional prohibition against
laws 'respecting an establishment of religion,' and thus provide[s] the proper framework
of analysis for the issues presented in the case before us." 421 U.S. 349, 358. See cases
cited in note 11 supra.
76. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
77. See, e.g., Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 828-33 (1973); Committee for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772-73 (1973).
78. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968). With the growing
sophistication of legislative bodies, there seems little likelihood that many legislative enactments would fail this first test.
79. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968); School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
80. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 772-73 (1973).
The "entanglement!" test was first discussed in Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970), as a component of the "primary effect" test, but
it was not used as an independent analytical test until Lemon. 403 U.S. at 613.
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to teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic elementary schools. 81
More recently, the Court has invalidated statutes providing direct grants
to nonpublic schools for maintenance and repair of school facilities, tuition reimbursement to parents of children attending nonpublic elementary and secondary schools, and tax "credits" to parents not qualified

to receive the tuition reimbursement because of an income cutoff
82
point.
Prior to the Court's decision in Meek v. Pittenger, the only
benefits to elementary and secondary sectarian schools which had survived constitutional attack in the Supreme Court were programs under
which textbooks were lent to all students in a district,83 and those where
parents of all school children, including those attending sectarian
schools, were reimbursed for bus fares.8 4 The location of the dividing

line between constitutionally valid programs and unconstitutional programs appeared to depend primarily on whether or not the questioned

state action became sufficiently enmeshed in the "Catch-22" situation
of trying to satisfy both the "primary effect" -and "excessive govern-

mental entanglement" requirements of the three-pronged test.8 5
In Meek v. Pittenger, the Court once again applied the three87
pronged test.80 Under one of the challenged statutes in Meek,
81. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The statutes involved were those
of Pennsylvania and Rhode Island.
82. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
The statutes involved were those of the State of New York.
83. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
84. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The Court has also upheld
grants of government funds directly or indirectly to sectarian institutions of higher education for the purpose of constructing buildings and facilities to be used exclusively for
secular educational purposes. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). See generally Note, Private Colleges, State Aid, and the Establishment Clause, 1975 DuKE L. 976.
85. Mr. Justice Powell, speaking for the Court in Nyquist, described this phenomenon as an attempt to "sail between the Scylla and Charybdis of 'effect' and 'entanglement.'" 413 U.S. at 788. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), provides a good
illustration of this problem. In that case, the Court implicitly recognized the propriety
of a state's furthering its interest in the education of its citizens through support of
the secular portion of education in sectarian schools. Id. at 613. The Court also noted
that the state properly heeded the constitutional necessity of circumscribing any support
of education in nonpublic schools with pervasive regulations designed to assure that such
support flowed only to secular educational activities. Id. Because of the dominantly
religious character of these sectarian elementary and secondary schools, however, the
Court concluded that "the very restrictions and surveillance necessary to ensure that
teachers play a strictly nonideological role give rise to the entanglements between church
and state." Id. at 620-21.
86. 421 U.S. at 358-59. The Court has, on occasion, mentioned yet another factor
-the potential or opportunity for "political fragmentation and division along religious
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Pennsylvania's State Secretary of Education was authorized to provide
auxiliary services to all nonpublic school children, such services to
include:
guidance, counseling and testing services; psychological services,
services for exceptional children; remedial and therapeutic services;
speech and hearing services; services for the improvement of the educationally disadvantaged (such as, but not limited to, teaching English as
a second language), and such other secular, neutral, non-ideological services as are of benefit to nonpublic school children and are presently
or hereafter provided for public school children for the Common88
wealth.
These services were to be provided on the premises of the nonpublic

schools by public school personnel.8 9
The second act authorized the state educational system to lend
textbooks to nonpublic school children90 and to lend instructional
materials and equipment-including projection, recording and laboratory equipment, maps, charts, globes, films, photographs, videotapesdirectly to qualifying nonpublic schools."' The Supreme Court, with
Justice Stewart writing for the majority, struck down both acts with the
exception of the textbook provision.9 2
lines." Id. at 372. This concern over potential political divisiveness, first expressed in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), has ususally been treated as an added concern after the first three tests have been applied. "A broader base of entanglement of
yet a different character is presented by the divisive political potential of these state programs." Id. at 622. See also Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 795-97 (1973). Earlier in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970),
Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion, had stated: "What is at stake as a matter of
policy is preventing that kind and degree of government involvement in religious life
that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and frequently strain a political system
to the breaking point." Id. at 694. In fact, as far back as Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1 (1947), Justice Black, in reviewing the background against which the first
amendment was adopted, noted the "civil strife" caused by sects "determined to maintain
their absolute political and religious supremacy." Id. at 8-9.
In Meek, however, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, attempted to raise this concern to the level of a fourth factor in testing whether a state
aid program to sectarian schools violates the establishment clause, 421 U.S. at 374-79,
despite language in Nyquist that this factor "may not alone warrant the invalidation of
state laws." 413 U.S. at 797-98. According to Justice Brennan, "the potential for political divisiveness related to religious belief and practice" was "key" to a determination
that the statutes in Lemon violated the establishment clause. 421 U.S. at 375.
87. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 9-972 et seq. (Supp. 1975).

88. Id. § 9-972(b).
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. § 9-972(c).
Id. § 9-973(c).
Id. § 9-973(e).
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
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1. InstructionalMaterialsand Equipment
While there was no question of whether a valid secular legislative
purpose existed, 93 the Court found that the loan of instructional
materials and equipment to nonpublic elementary and secondary
schools had the "primary effect' of advancing religion since the beneficiaries were sectarian schools.91 The Court saw this as a "massive
aid" 5 program to church-related nonpublic schools as distinguished
from the indirect or incidental aid of, for example, bus transportation
or school lunch programs which included church-related schools as part
of a program provided for all students. 6 Even though some of the
materials and equipment to be provided were "self-policing," ' 7 the
amount of aid under the statute was such that "it would simply ignore
reality to attempt to separate secular educational functions from the
predominantly religious role performed"9 8 by the church-related
schools. Thus, "[e]ven though earmarked for secular purposes, 'when
it flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission,' state
aid has the impermissible primary effect of advancing religion." 99
The Court, therefore, appears to have all but come around to the view
that aid of almost any kind to sectarian schools-even if earmarked and
precisely tailored for secular purposes---"frees up" other money of the
sectarian institution, thereby permitting such "freed-up" money to be
100
spent on the fostering of religion.
2. Assignment of PublicSchool Employees to ParochialSchools
The Supreme Court, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, had distinguished
statutes which provide textbooks to be lent to all children (whether
they are attending public or private sectarian schools)' 0°-upheld as
93. Id. at 363.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 365.
96. Id. at 364-65.
97. Id. at 365.

98. Id.
99. Id. at 365-66, quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973).
100. See, for example, Justice Douglas's separate opinions in Wheeler v. Barrera, 417
U.S. 402, 431-32 (1974); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 694-95 (1971); and
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 641-42 (1971). See also id. at 660 (Justice Brennan's separate opinion). The majority of the Court, of course, has never accepted this
"freeing-up" analysis in higher education cases. See Note, Private Colleges, supra note

84, at 995.
101. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
102. A Pennsylvania statute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5601-08 (Supp. 1974), aided
sectarian schools by providing for reimbursement of the cost of lay teachers' salaries in
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constitutional-from statutes which impermissibly provide sectarian
schools or teachers with salary payments, 102 noting that "teachers have
a substantially different ideological character from books. . . . [A]
textbook's content is ascertainable, but a teacher's handling of a subject
is not."'10 3 The Court further stated that it could not "ignore the danger that a teacher under religious control and discipline poses to the
separation of the religious from the purely secular aspects of precollege education."1 0 However, none of the cases to come before the
Supreme Court until Meek'0 5 had involved the use of public school
teachers on private school premises, whether to teach in the core curriculum or to provide auxiliary and remedial services." 8
specified secular subjects. A Rhode Island statute, R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 16-15-1
to -9 (Supp. 1973), provided for payments directly to lay teachers of secular subjects
in nonpublic schools as a supplement of fifteen percent of their current annual salary.
103. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 617 (1971).
104. Id. (emphasis added).
105. See Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Committee for
Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971); Earley v. DiCenso, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
106. Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Meek, the question of whether the same
degree of conflict "inheres in the situation" when public school teachers are sent into
private schools had been addressed by a three-judge district court in New Jersey in Public Funds for Pub. Schools v. Marburger, 358 F. Supp. 29 (D.N.J. 1973), affd mem.,
417 U.S. 961 (1974). The district court responded to the question of whether a public
school employee, assigned to a parochial school for certain hours, is a teacher "under
religious control" as follows:
The defendants argue that no surveillance would be required to enforce State
limitations in the auxiliary program because the processes which would be involved in remedial reading or remedial arithmetic are clearly more peripheral
to the possibility of religious indoctrination than the initial teaching of reading
and arithmetic. Even though this argument is sound, to a degree, a teacher
who teaches reading or remedial reading remains a teacher. A teacher's instruction may vary in content or emphasis and is not entirely predictable. A
teacher is not a textbook, the contents of which remain constant, as the Court
recognized in Lemon ....
This being so, it would be necessary to continually review the content of a teacher's instruction in order to see that it adheres
to the restrictions imposed by the statute, in that it be confined only to secular
and non-ideological subject matter.
Moreover, it is clear that the teachers providing such auxiliary services
will be functioning within the confines and environment of a given religious
institution where a religious atmosphere may be pervasive. Although the
teachers of auxiliary services are not employed by a religious organization and
are not directly subject to the direction and discipline of a religious authority,
they will, nonetheless, be working in atmospheres dedicated to the rearing of
children in a particular religious faith. Again it would seem that a constant review of that instruction would be required in order to determine that the religious atmosphere has not caused religion to be reflected---even unintentionally
-in the instruction provided by such teachers. 358 F. Supp. at 40.
See also Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. Oakey, 339 F. Supp.
545, 553 (D. Vt. 1972); People ex rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 56 IMI. 2d 1, 10-12, 305
N.E.2d 129, 134 (1973).
The three-judge district court which decided Meek v. Pittenger, 374 F. Supp. 639
(E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), thought differently,
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The auxiliary services provided for in the Pennsylvania statute
challenged in Meek were designated for nonpublic school children
rather than for the schools.10 7

Nevertheless, the Court invalidated the

statute, noting that the "prophylactic contacts" necessary on the part of
the state "to ensure that teachers play a strictly nonideological role' 0 8
would trigger the third part of the Lemon test---excessive entanglement
between church and state. Despite dicta in Wheeler that auxiliary and

compensatory services, when provided by public school employees a
few hours per week on parochial school premises, might survive constitutional scrutiny, 10

the Meek Court found irrelevant the fact that

teachers are utilized "only for remedial and exceptional students, and
not for normal students participating in the core curriculum,"" 0Oat least
with regard to "the danger that religious doctrine will become intertwined with secular instruction. ..

."11

The Court also found no distinction between the teachers "under
religious control and discipline" present in Lemon v. Kurtzman"12 and
employees of the public school system with regard to their suscepti-

bility to religious influence:
To be sure, auxiliary services personnel, because not employed by the
nonpublic schools, are not directly subject to the discipline of a religious
authority . . . . But they are performing important educational services in schools in which education is an integral part of the dominant
sectarian mission and in which an atmosphere dedicated to the
advancement of religious belief is constantly maintained . . . . The
potential for impermissible fostering of religion under these circumhowever: "The notion that by setting foot inside a sectarian school a professional therapist or counselor will succumb to sectarianization of his or her professional work is not
supported by any evidence." 374 F. Supp. at 657.
107. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 9-972 (Supp. 1975).
108. 421 U.S. at 370.
109. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority in Wheeler, was careful to point out
that "we intimate no view as to the Establishment Clause effect of any particular program." Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402, 426 (1974). He did note, however, that
if state and local agencies decide to comply with Title I requirements by using on-thepremises parochial school instruction
the range of possibilities is a broad one and the First Amendment implications
may vary according to the precise contours of the plan that is formulated. For
example, a program whereby a former parochial school teacher is paid with
Title I funds to teach full time in a parochial school undoubtedly would present quite different problems than if a public school teacher, solely under public control, is sent into a parochial school to teach special remedial courses a
few hours a week. Id.
Justice Blackmun joined the majority in Meek, however, in its holding unconstitutional
the provision of remedial services to parochial school students.
110. 421 U.S. at 370.
111. Id.
112. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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stances, although somewhat reduced, is nonetheless present. To be certain that auxiliary teachers remain religiously neutral, as the Constitution
demands, the State would have to impose limitations on the activities
of auxiliary personnel and then engage in some form of continuing sur113
veillance to ensure that those restrictions were being followed.
The Court thus found no constitutionally significant distinction between
the provisions of auxiliary remedial services and secular subjects which
are part of the core curriculum, or between lay teachers hired by the
religious institution and state employees.
It was this latter aspect of the Court's opinion to which the Chief
Justice dissented most vehemently:
[T]here is no basis in "experience and history" to conclude that a State's
attempt to provide-through the services of its own state-selected professionals-the remedial assistance necessary for all its children poses
the same potential for unnecessary administrative entanglement or
divisive political confrontation which concerned the Court in Lemon v..
Kurtzman .... 14
Similarly, Justice Rehnquist, speaking for himself and Justice White,
found that "the opportunities for religious instruction through the auxiliary services program are greatly reduced . . . ."15 Justice Rehnquist
stated that even if the distinction between such auxiliary services as
remedial and guidance services and the core curriculum is only one of
degree, the fact that these services are provided by public school
employees should lead to a "different constitutional result" from the
situation where parochial school teachers subject to "religious control
and discipline" are involved."'
The majority, as at least one commentator has noted,"17 simply
failed to explain why state "surveillance" of the activities of its own
employees would involve "excessive governmental entanglement" with
religion, even if it were likely that public employees, providing remedial and therapeutic services and subject to the authority of public
school officials, would tend to "inculcate religion."
3.

Textbook Loan Programs

Justice Stewart, writing for himself and Justices Blackmun and
Powell, upheld the textbook loan program, finding it indistinguishable
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

421 U.S. at 371-72.
Id. at 385-86.
Id. at 393.
Id. at 393-94.
See The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, supra note 74, at 108 n.35.
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from that found constitutionally permissible in Board of Education v.
Allen.11 8 Both Allen and Everson v. Board of Education' 9 suggest
that certain benefits which go to all children, whether public or private
school students (or their parents), and which benefit sectarian institutions only indirectly, if at all, will withstand attack under the first
amendment. "It is . . . well established. . . that not every law that
confers an 'indirect,' 'remote,' or 'incidental' benefit upon religious
institutions is, for that reason alone, constitutionally invalid.' °
Justice Stewart emphasized that like the New York statute upheld
in Allen, the Pennsylvania plan provides textbooks to all children
free of charge and the books are lent directly to the student and not
to the school.1 2 ' Moreover, the textbooks must be secular textbooks
"acceptable for use in any public, elementary or secondary school."'122
The Court further narrowed its holding by contrasting the scheme
involved in Meek with the New Jersey textbook statute, which was held
unconstitutional by a district court in Public Funds for Public Schools
2
v. Marburger:' 3
[The New Jersey plan was] not designed to extend to all schoolchildren
of the State, whether attending public or nonpublic schools, the benefits
of State-loaned -textbooks. Although New Jersey public school children
were lent their textbooks, § 5 of the Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act, challenged in Marburger, provided that the State
Commissioner of Education reimburse the parents of nonpublic schoolchildren for money spent to purchase secular, nonideological textbooks.
The District Court based its decision that the textbook provisions violated the constitutional prohibition against laws "respecting an establishment of religion" on the fact that the assistance provided-reimbursement for purchased books-was not extended to parents of all students,
but rather was directed exclusively to parents1 24whose children were
enrolled in nonpublic, primarily religious schools.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall,
dissented from that portion of the Meek opinion which upheld the
constitutionality of the textbook loan program on two grounds. The
first ground was the existence of "a serious potential for divisive conflict
118. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
119. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
120. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist 413 U.S. 756, 771

(1973).
121. Justice Brennan disagreed with this position.

See notes 125-30 infra and

accompanying text.
122. 421 U.S. at 361.
123. 358 F. Supp. 29 (D.N.J. 1973), aj'd mem., 417 U.S. 961 (1974).
124. 421 U.S. at 362 n.12 (emphasis in original).
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over the issue of aid to religion."'u 5 Justice Brennan found that the textbook loan program (to children) would fall just as did the instructional
materials and equipment loan program (to schools) since both depend
on continuing annual appropriations and the textbook loan program involves "increasingly massive sums."'12 6 To him, this meant that the potential for political divisiveness was great. In addition, Justice Brennan
discounted the child benefit theory-that textbooks are lent to students
while instructional materials and equipment are lent directly to the
schools-since the book program, as actually administered, was
handled by the nonpublic school authorities and the state without any
involvement of the students or their parents. 27 Thus the textbook loan
was to the schools and not to the students.
Even if the textbooks were lent directly to the students, the size
of the aid program and its dependency on continuing annual appropriations, as noted above, would make the factor of political divisiveness
the basis on which the program must founder.12 8 The program, in
Justice Brennan's view, was therefore indistinguishable from the programs which provided loans of instructional materials and equipment
and auxiliary services to nonpublic schools which the majority had held
29
constitutionally impermissible.1
Finally, the Pennsylvania act was distinguishable from the statute
upheld in Allen, according to Justice Brennan, in that the Meek textbook assistance extends only to children who attend nonpublic schools
while different legislation provides textbooks to public schools.'3 0
1.

TITLE I AND THE CHILD BENEFIT THEORY

In view of the Court's position with regard to the "self-policing"
instructional materials and equipment-that the secular educational
functions are so entwined with the predominately religious role of these
institutions that aid cannot be channeled to the secular function without
providing direct aid to the sectarian-the textbook loan program can
only be distinguished on the basis of the child benefit theory.13 It is
125. Id. at 382. See note 86 supra.
126. Id. at 381-82.
127. Id. at 379-80.
128. See notes 126-27 supra and accompanying text.
129. Id. at 384.
130. Id. at 383-84. But see id. at 360 n.8, 390 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 365. What was in effect a child benefit theory-although it was not so
termed-was first used as a basis for upholding a parochial aid program in Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947). And it was first rejected in that case as
well-in Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion: "It is of no importance in this situation
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not clear, however, how far one can continue to travel constitutionally
with this theory. There would seem to be several conditions that still
have to be met to withstand a ruling of unconstitutionality.
(1)

The program must be designed to benefit all children

Both Allen and Everson. clearly involved benefits for all children,
whether public or nonpublic school students (or their parents). Partial
tuition reimbursement and tax credit legislation, which has been found
by the Court to be unconstitutional,'1 32 can be distinguished from Allen
and Everson on the ground that in the former plans, economic benefits
went only to a special class of parents and their children (those who
utilized the parochial schools), while in the latter, the benefits went to
all children or their parents, regardless of the school they attended. The
busing and book loan programs thus were designed for all children,
with those who attend church-related schools being allowed to participate along with all other children. Moreover, since the tuition reimbursement struck down in Nyquist was for secular education only, policing of the plan may have involved excessive governmental entanglewhether the beneficiary of this expenditure of taxed-raised funds is primarily the
parochial school and incidentally the pupil, or whether the aid is directly bestowed on
the pupil with indirect benefits to the school." Id. at 24 (Jackson, J., dissenting). The
child benefit theory was one of the political compromises which permitted the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) to be enacted in 1965. See notes 1-7 supra
and accompanying text. The ESA broke the decades-long deadlock over whether
federal aid to education constitutionally could be provided to sectarian as well as secular
schools by providing that funds would be used for disadvantaged children, not as general
aid for schools, thus enabling parochial school children to share in the benefits of the
Act.
Justice Douglas has vigorously dissented from this view of the child benefit theory:
Mhe program here [cannot] be minimized from scrutiny under the Establishment Clause by portraying this aid as going to the children rather than to the
sectarian schools. That argument deserves no more weight in the Establishment Clause context than it received under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment . ..
If the traditional First Amendment barriers are to be maintained, no program serving students in parochial schools could be designed under this Actwhether regular school hours are used, or after-school hours, or weekend hours.
The plain truth is that under the First Amendment, as construed to this day,
the Act is unconstitutional to the extent it supports sectarian schools whether
directly or through its students. Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. at 432 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
As noted earlier, see notes 107-08 supra and accompanying text, the auxiliary
services in Meek were also designated for nonpublic school children rather than the
schools. The program failed, however, because it would of necessity lead to "excessive
governmental entanglement" with religion.
132. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. United Americans for Pub. Schools, 419 U.S. 890
(1974) (summarily affirming an unreported decision of the District Court for the
Northern District of California which had held the California tax credit plan unconstitutional); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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ment. Alternatively, such a plan would still encounter difficulty with the
second aspect of the Lemon test-the primary effect of advancing
religion.
(2)

The benefit must involve "self-policing" instructional materials33
or non-educationalbenefits3 '

The concept of "self-policing instructional materials" is to be
construed narrowly. As one court has pointed out, 35 movie projectors
and tape recorders, while seemingly neutral, can also be used for religious purposes."" Continuous review and control would therefore be
necessary, and this, in turn, would likely mean excessive governmental
"entanglement."' 137 Teachers, whether subject to "religious control and
discipline" or public school employees, and whether hired to teach
remedial and exceptional students or average students enrolled in the
core curriculum, are not self-policing and will require continuing surveillance by the state to ensure that religious instruction is separated
from secular instruction. The only personnel who may still be permitted in private schools are those who, as part of general legislation,
are involved in
programs providing bus transportation, school lunches, and public health
facilities-secular and nonideological services unrelated to the primary,
religious-oriented educational function of the sectarian school. The
indirect and incidental benefits to church-related schools from those programs do not offend the constitutional prohibition against establishment
of religion.' 88
(3)

The benefit must not be "massive aid" directly to parochialschools
but may accrue only incidentally and indirectly to such schools

Even as to self-policing items, however, the Court has indicated
that a "massive aid" program providing state loans of instructional
material and equipment directly to "religion-pervasive institutions"133. In Board of Educ. v. Alien, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), the materials involved were
secular books on loan to pupils.
134. In Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the payments to parents were
reimbursement for bus fare.
135. Public Funds for Pub. Schools v. Marburger, 358 F. Supp. 29 (D.NJ. 1973),
afrd mem., 417 U.S. 961 (1974).
136. 358 F. Supp. at 38-39. Even the lower court in Meek was in agreement as to
the potential use of projectors, tape recorders, and cameras for religious purposes. 374
F. Supp. at 661.
137. 358 F. Supp. at 39.
138. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 364-65 (1975).
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while possibly avoiding the "excessive governmental entanglefient!'
prong of the test-directly conflicts with the "primary effect of advancing religion" aspect."39 In Meek (as in Marburger), the support
involved a special state legislative appropriation which provided equipment solely for parochial schools (while presumably such equipment
in public schools was paid for at the local level). Thus the legislation
140
provided a special benefit for "relatively few religious groups.'
Finally, the fact that the equipment and materials are loaned
directly to the parochial school and not to the child or his parents, in
contrast to Allen and Everson where the benefit was seen as accruing
only indirectly to the school, and the fact that such equipment is to be
used in the core curriculum, clearly make the legislation constitutionally
impermissible.
To what extent are the three conditions discussed above present
in the Title I requirements for the provision of "comparable services"
to private school students? To recapitulate: First, Title I requires that
federal funds be used to meet the "special educational needs of educationally deprived children in school attendance areas having high concentrations of children from low income families."'' 4 Second, these
funds must
be so used (i) as to supplement and, to the extent practical, increase the
level of funds that would, in the absence of such Federal funds, be made
available from non-Federal sources . . .

,

and (ii) in no case, as to

supplant such funds from non-Federal sources .... 42
Thus, unlike the loan of instructional materials and equipment involved
in Meek, the Title I aid may not be used for the core curriculum but
only for the special needs of educationally deprived children above and
beyond the regular school program-in the case of public schools, the
regular program being funded from state and local funds, and in the
case of private schools, from private funds. Therefore Title I programs
arguably are not equivalent to a direct grant to the school, inasmuch
as Title I's compensatory services add on to what the regular school
system would provide, in public schools as well as in private schools,
considerably weakening the "freeing up?' or "direct aid to the sectarian
43
function" argument.
The supplementing provisions quoted above, however, create an
especially difficult problem in the context of nonpublic schools. If
139. Id. at 364-66.

140.
141.
142.
143.

See note 152 infra and accompanying text.
20 U.S.C.A. § 241e(a)(1) (Supp. 1976).
20 U.S.C. § 241e(a)(3) (1970).
See note 100 supra and accompanying text.
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Title I funds may be used only for supplemental programs, how are
"local education agencies" to ensure compliance by parochial school
officials without violating the "excessive entanglement" prohibition?
The current HEW regulations apparently interpret the statutory
supplementing provisions as applying only to public schools:
No project under Title I of the Act will be deemed to meet the special
educational needs of educationally deprived children unless the Federal
funds made available for that project (1) will be used to supplement,
and to the extent practical increase, the level of State and local funds
that would, in the absence of such Federal funds, be made available
for the education of pupils participating in that project; (2) will not be
used to supplant State and local funds available for the education of such
pupils; and (3) will not be used to provide instructional or auxiliary
services in project area schools that are ordinarily provided
with State
144
and local funds to children in nonproject area schools.

No reference is made to alternative private funding sources. The
regulatory structure thus rests on what must be termed a very questionable assumption-that no private schools would have budgeted for the
provision of Title I-type auxiliary and remedial services in the absence
of federal funds. That is, Title I administrators apparently have been
content to assume that none of the private schools benefited by the program has been able to take advantage of the funding by manipulating
its budget.

45

New regulations proposed in March, 1975, however, can be read
as applying the supplementing prohibition to private schools: "Provisions for serving children in private schools shall not include the
financing of the existing level of instruction in the private schools."'1 46
No auditing mechanism is created, and local agencies are simply
required to state in project applications how the needs of educationally
deprived children were assessed, the number of children who are to
participate, and the degree and manner of participation. 1 47 Neverthe144. 45 C.F.R. § 116.17(h) (1975) (emphasis added).

145. For example, it might be imagined that prior to the advent of Title I funding, a
private school already provided, or was planning to provide, certain remedial education
courses for its disadvantaged students. Upon learning of the availability of Title I funds,
the school's administration removed the remedial program from its budget, and shifted
the budgeted funds into a capital account for the construction of a new chapel on the
school grounds. The current regulations provide no mechanism for assuring that such a
"freeing up" would not occur. Although this illustration is an extreme one, it might be
argued that changes in educational trends would have led many private schools to utilize
tuition and privately contributed funds to supply many of the same services which Title I
now underwrites.
146. Proposed HEW Reg. § 116a.23(d), 40 Fed. Reg. 11,483 (1975).

147. Id.
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less, if the prohibition against "financing the existing level of instruction" is to be enforced, it would seem that some type of surveillance
by public officials of the programs being provided on parochial school
premises must be instituted and must extend to the budgeting process
of the benefited private schools. Any such surveillance, obviously,
would present difficult "entanglement" problems.
The second point of distinction between the legislation providing
for loans of instructional materials and equipment overturned in Meek
and the Title I legislation is that the latter provides funds for disadvantaged children, whether in public or nonpublic schools, making the
benefit more analogous to that upheld in Allen; in other words, the purchase of instructional materials is part of a general program of special
help to all disadvantaged children. As the majority in Meek emphasizes, "as part of general legislation made available to all students,
a State may include church-related schools in

. .

. secular and

nonideological services unrelated to the primary, religious-oriented
educational function of the sectarian school."'1 4 8 This distinction
between Title I legislation and that in Meek seems to be the basis for
the position of HEW officials that the regulations for implementing the
provisions of Title I concerned with the participation of private school
children need not be revised with a view to meeting the Meek guidelines. 149
Finally, one other aspect of the legislation involved in Meek that
is arguably different from Title I legislation should be noted, namely
the concern for potential political conflict. Justice Stewart, referring
to the fact that the appropriations process is such that there will be
annual reconsideration of the auxiliary-services statute,150 recognized
that there could therefore be "successive opportunities for political fragmentation and division along religious lines."' 151 In Lemon
it was noted that "[h]ere we are confronted with successive and very
likely annual appropriationsthat benefit relatively few religious groups.
Political fragmentation and divisiveness on religious lines are thus likely
Arguably, however, the statutes involved in
to be intensified."' '
Lemon and the programs involved in Nyquist'53 -direct money grants
148.
149.
Office
1975.
150.
151.
152.
153.

421 U.S. at 364 (emphasis added).
Telephone communication with Dr. John Staehle, Chief of Program Services,
of Education, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, November 20,
See notes 47-49 supra and accompanying text. But see note 14 supra.
421 U.S. at 372.
Id.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971) (emphasis added).
413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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for maintenance and repair of nonpublic school facilities, tuition
reimbursement for parents of children attending nonpublic schools, and
tax relief for parents not qualifying for tuition reimbursement-are distinguishable from Title I programs, as well . some of the programs
involved in Meek. In Lemon and Nyquist, economic benefits went
only to a special class of parents and their children (those who utilized
the parochial schools), or to the parochial schools or their teachers
directly. In Meek, and even more so with Title I services, the benefits
are for all children, whether public or .onpublic school students (or
their parents). The appropriations may therefore be more readily seen
as aiding children; the fact that a child attends a school is relevant only
as to the location for distributing such benefits to him. Thus, if the
benefits of Title I are seen as being for all children rather than for
"relatively few religious groups," perhaps the potential for political
divisiveness along religious lines is not as great.
With regard to the use of public school employees on parochial
school premises, however, there is nothing in the Meek Court's discussion of auxiliary services which suggests that a valid constitutional distinction can be drawn between such auxiliary services as remedial reading and arithmetic provided for the benefit of all school children in the
state, and similar kinds of programs provided under Title I to disadvantaged students from both public and nonpublic schools. Indeed, the
Title I guidelines for such services do not seem significantly different
from the provisions of the Pennsylvania statute.Y4 Consequently, with
the seeming exception of programs providing bus transportation, school
lunches, and public health facilities, it appears that Title I-funded
public school personnel could not be used even to provide auxiliary,
remedial services to educationally deprived children on parochial school
premises since teachers are not "self-policing" items. Yet this is the
heart of the Title I program. Whether the distinction between those
public school employees who teach on parochial school premises during
regular school hours and those who teach before or after school hours" 5
is a constitutionally valid one under the first amendment is arguable.
154. Public school personnel may be made available on other than public school
facilities only to the extent necessary to provide special services (such as therapeutic, remedial, or welfare services, broadened health services, school breakfasts for poor children, and guidance and counseling services) for those educationally deprived children for whose needs such services were designed and
only when such services are not normally provided by the private schools. Proposed Financial Assistance Guidelines for Educationally Deprived Children §
116a.23(f), 40 Fed. Reg. 11483 (1975).
See notes 107-08 supra and accompanying text.

155. This was the distinction relied upon by the Missouri court in Mallory v. Barrera,
Civil No. 782847 (Cir. Ct. Jackson County, Mo., filed Sept. 2, 1975).
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It may well be contended that the potential for "impermissible fostering
of religion" is considerably reduced when public school personnel are
employed on parochial school premises only after school hours, and thus
the need for continuing state surveillance would also be diminished. 5 6
Finally, Meek implies some significant limitations on the uses to
which federal funds can be put in parochial schools. In addition to the
curtailment of Title I discussed earlier-primarily the use of public
school employees on private school premises during (and perhaps
after) regular school hours to conduct auxiliary programs such as
remedial reading and arithmetic and to provide counseling-other
federal programs may be similarly curtailed. For example, the provision for loans to nonpublic schools in order to obtain educational equipment for academic subjects under the National Defense Education
Act' 57 may no longer be constitutionally permissible. Similarly, federal
funds to private schools for bilingual teaching may be constitutionally
1 58
barred.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decisions in Wheeler v. Barrera and Meek
v. Pittenger should have a substantial impact on the future of the Title
I program. Utilization of federal funds may vary substantially from
state to state as local public education agencies struggle to comply with
the "comparable services" requirements of the program without violating state constitutional prohibitions on aid to nonpublic educational
institutions. Whether such restrictions will hamstring Title I efforts in
a significant number of states will depend on state court interpretations
of state constitutional prohibitions, and on -the willingness of states to
amend or repeal provisions which stand as barriers to the receipt of federal money.
Apart from the problems stemming from state restrictions on the
ability of public school officials to provide "comparable services" to
eligible nonpublic school children, the Supreme Court's recent pronouncements on the breadth of the immunity against first amendment
attack afforded aid programs by the child benefit theory may jeopardize
the heart of the Title I effort-remedial instruction. If the establish156. But see Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402, 432 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
157. See note 69 supra.
158. See note 70 supra. One can simply substitute "bilingual reading" in the Meek
Court's statement regarding the use of publicly funded teachers to support this contention: "[W]hether the subject is 'remedial reading,' . . . or simply 'reading,' a teacher
remains a teacher, and the danger that religious doctrine will become intertwined with
secular instruction persists." 421 U.S. at 370.
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ment clause stands as a barrier to the use of Title I-funded remedial
arithmetic and reading teachers in nonpublic schools, the politicalconstitutional dilemma which dictated the structure of Title I may force
a major revamping of federal efforts to provide aid to elementary and
secondary education. It will require careful navigation if federal and
state administrators are to steer a steady course between the Scylla of
"comparable services" and the Charybdis of the first amendment.

